A recent investigation by seismologists at Geoscience Australia has unearthed new evidence with which to modify the epicentral location of the 7 June 1918 Queensland earthquake. This event, and its relocation, has been described in detail by Martin et al. (2023) in a Geoscience Australia Record (currently in review) with key results summarised here. This event is the largest earthquake in eastern Australia in at least the past ~150 years (at the time of writing). It was extensively felt in eastern Queensland and in parts of northern New South Wales. The GA study has documented reports of felt shaking from 225 individual locations for this event. 

Almost all previous studies (e.g., Hedley, 1925; Gutenberg and Richter, 1954) repeat the offshore epicentral location (-24o S, 154o E) proposed by the Riverview Observatory in 1918. The currently accepted location ( 23.5o S, 152.5o E) for the 1918 event in the GA hazard catalogue (Allen et al., 2018) is from Everingham et al. (1987). 

The attention of early investigations was largely focused on the minor damage sustained by masonry structures in larger coastal towns such as Gladstone and Rockhampton. This is similar to the 1954 Adelaide earthquake, wherein, as pointed out by Martin et al. (2022), focus was largely on damage within the City of Adelaide with poor attention paid to damage in the thinly populated Adelaide Hills. The coastal damage observations from the 1918 Queensland earthquake supported an offshore source. However, the newly found evidence also points to severe shaking at inland locations to the south-west of Gladstone. The strongest evidence comes from the owner of a cattle station at Camboon who described severe shaking; in his words “I could scarcely keep my feet, the place was rocking so”. Minor damage was reported from a few locations such as Banana (Hedley, 1925) but owing to the low-rise, wood-frame, Queenslander-type buildings that made up the building stock in these remote areas no major damage is known of. 

Not only did the new GA study by Martin et al. (2023) document these shaking effects, but they also documented a long sequence of felt aftershocks that lasted as long as a year at Camboon. Two large aftershocks have been identified previously (Rynn et al., 1987) that were felt in the Bundaberg-Gladstone region within hours of the mainshock. However, none of the subsequent shocks were perceived anywhere else except in the region of Camboon. 
Neither the newly identified zone of aftershocks, nor the region of strongest shaking are consistent with an offshore epicentre. Unfortunately, as with the 1954 Adelaide earthquake (Bolt, 1955-56), instrumental observations are few. The best instrumental evidence for the 1918 earthquake comes from the Riverview observatory in Sydney where the shock was recorded on two different seismographs. The time difference between the primary (P) and secondary (S) seismic waves (multiplied by some constant) can be used as a crude measure of distance to an earthquake’s epicenter. The arrival times of these waves were picked by observatory staff, and these were subsequently published in the Riverview Seismological Station bulletin. The S-P arrival times derived from this publication have supported an offshore source, at a distance of ~1250km from Sydney. But over the course of the investigations by GA, written correspondence was found between Walter Bryan, a renowned Queensland geologist, who questioned this offshore source. In the communication that ensued between him and the Riverview Observatory in the 1930s, it became clear that the arrival picks at Riverview could be erroneous. Surprisingly, this evidence does not appear to have been known to most subsequent investigators.

In this latest investigation, seismologists at GA double-checked these arrivals by consulting the original hardcopy seismograms for the event preserved at GA. They repicked the arrivals which yielded much shorter S-P times. These correspond to a distance of ~990kms which now corresponds well with the distance from Sydney to both the region of high intensities onshore, and the area with documented aftershocks also onshore. 
These different lines of evidence now offer convincing evidence that the source of the 1918 Queensland earthquake was onshore in the region of Camboon, and not offshore, as previously assumed. This study also estimates a reviewed magnitude in the range of M6.0-M6.2 based on limited instrumental data that exists for the earthquake from Australia.

References:

• Allen, T. I., M. Leonard, H. Ghasemi, and G. Gibson (2018). The 2018 National Seismic Hazard Assessment for Australia: earthquake epicentre catalogue, Geoscience Australia Record 2018/30, Canberra, 51 pp, doi: 10.11636/Record.2018.030.
• Bolt., B. (1955-1956). The epicentre of the Adelaide earthquakes of 1954 March 1, Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol 89-90, pp 40-43.
• Everingham, I.B., D. Denham and S.A. Greenhalgh (1987), Surface-wave magnitudes of some early Australian earthquakes, BMG Journal of Australian Geology and Geophysics, Vol. 10, pp 253-259.
• Gutenberg, B. and C.F. Richter (1954). Seismicity of the earth and associated phenomena, Princeton University Press.
• Hedley, C. (1925). The Queensland earthquake of 1918, Transactions of the Royal Geographic Society of Australia, Vol 1, pp 151 – 156.
• Martin, S.S., P.R. Cummins, J.D. Griffin, D. Clark, T.I. Allen (2022). Reviewing the 1st March 1954 Adelaide Earthquake, South Australia, Australian Earthquake Engineering Society 2022 conference, Mount Macedon, 11 pp (https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/282619).
• Martin, S.S., P.R. Cummins, T.I. Allen, J. Griffin, D. Clark, N. Peljo (2023). The 1918 Queensland Earthquake: Resolving an uncertain epicentre and magnitude, Geoscience Australia Record, Canberra (in review).
• Rynn, J., D. Denham, S. Greenhalgh, T. Jones, P.J. Gregson, K.F. McCue and R.S. Smith (1987). Atlas of isoseismal maps of Australian earthquakes, Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology & Geophysics Bulletin, Vol 222, 169 p., Canberra.

During the summer of 2023–2024, Queensland faced significant tropical cyclone (TC) events that caused widespread disruption and damage. The first, TC Jasper, made landfall along the Far North Queensland (FNQ) coast on December 13, 2023, initially reaching a peak intensity of Category 4 with winds of up to 130 km/h before crossing the coast as a Category 2 system. Shortly after, on January 25, 2024, TC Kirrily struck North Queensland (NQ), having peaked at Category 3 intensity, with wind gusts reaching 120 km/h, but downgrading to Category 1 by the time it crossed the coast. Both cyclones occurred during the summer holiday season, when many travellers from across Australia and internationally visit NQ and FNQ, particularly for camping and beach holidays, amplifying the social and economic impacts of these severe weather events.

Government clarity during emergencies is crucial, as people seek guidance from state leaders (Grantham, 2023), often through media conferences that are key for public communication and political accountability (Craig, 2016; McLean & Ewart, 2020). However, communicators must use and acknowledge social media platforms when delivering public safety messages (Grantham, 2023). There has been a significant rise in the reliance on social media platforms for information and a more significant rise in the use of TikTok as one of these platforms (Lewis & Grantham, 2022). It has been described as a social media platform following an antisocial approach. Users do not need to follow an account to view content which reinforces the platform's publicness.  This study scrutinises crisis communication by exploring the interaction between official government messages and the rise of TikTok as an information source during emergencies. It uses the IDEA model (Sellnow et al., 2023), a structured framework for effective risk and crisis communication that emphasises four key elements: Internalisation, Distribution, Explanation, and Action. This model guides communicators in creating messages that are clear, accessible, and actionable, ensuring public understanding and appropriate responses in emergencies. Widely applied across diverse scenarios, the IDEA model is simple and adaptable, making it a valuable tool for emergency communicators.

Seven media conferences for TC Jasper (December 7, 11, 12 and 13) and TC Kirrily (January 23, 24 and 25) were analysed using the IDEA model (Sellnow et al., 2023), revealing the involvement of 12 speakers across the two weather events, eight of which were political representatives, only four were emergency service representatives (Tables 1 and 2). A critical difference between the December and January cyclone events lies in the structure of spokesperson representation. The December event had a more streamlined approach, with fewer speakers and minimal political presence early on. For example, on December 7, only one politician was among four speakers, allowing each to share unique, focused information without redundancy. However, as the event progressed, the number of politicians increased, and overlapping information emerged, potentially sacrificing clarity. In the January event, there was a solid political presence from the start, with four politicians among seven speakers on January 23, and this pattern continued over subsequent days. Notably, representatives from emergency services, such as Fire and Emergency Services and the Police Commissioner, were often absent (Table 2). This reduced operational focus may have shifted the tone of the conferences from practical guidance to political visibility, as political figures dominated the communication space.

Queensland’s crisis communication during TC’s Jasper and Kirrily demonstrated partial application of the IDEA model, revealing effective strategies and improvement areas. Action was consistently emphasised, with clear instructions such as avoiding floodwaters and basic instructions to prepare emergency kits, while internalisation fostered emotional engagement through appeals to community resilience and safety. Notably, communication during TC Kirrily showed an enhanced clarity in explanation, with less reliance on technical jargon, making safety advice more accessible. However, gaps in distribution were evident, as the government’s minimal presence on various social media platforms limited engagement with audiences who rely on these platforms for information.
The involvement of political representatives in media briefings added complexity, blending safety messaging with political accountability and resource discussions. While their presence supported internalisation by addressing specific community concerns, it occasionally detracted from delivering focused, actionable crisis communication. These findings highlight the need for a more comprehensive application of the IDEA model, particularly in leveraging emerging platforms like TikTok to distribute clear, inclusive, and timely information during emergencies.

During both cyclone events, locals used TikTok to share their experiences. TikTok data was collected as each cyclone made landfall (TC Jasper n=50; TC Kirrily n=50). The findings highlight a significant gap in government presence, particularly during TC Jasper, where public-generated content (n=32) and content that endorses concerning behaviour (n=17) dominated, 13 of which were performed outside in the elements of the storm. Examples of these are presented in Images 1 and 2, which depict two videos that were analysed as being performed outside of the elements, the video in Image 2 is also coded as humorous.

In contrast, the TikTok content for TC Kirrily displayed a focus on informational (n=42) and educational (n=8) objectives. Education-based videos provided practical advice on cyclone readiness. There were also localised updates, often captured from residents' homes, which added a personal dimension to the event and received very high viewership, such as the video in Image 3, which received 230,000 views at the time of collection. Notably, some videos documented risky behaviour negatively, such as cyclone surfing, which introduced a unique focus on the dangers of disregarding safety advice rather than encouraging it, as we saw in TC Jasper. While user-generated content further enriched the narrative by showcasing on-the-ground realities and innovative ways of engaging with the crisis of engaging with the crisis (image 4).

The analysis of TC’s Jasper and Kirrily highlights the strengths and gaps in crisis communication across traditional and social media platforms. While official briefings provided straightforward but basic actions, the use of overly technical language and limited use of social media platforms hindered broader engagement. TikTok emerged as a dynamic tool, dominated by public-generated content that informed but risked encouraging dangerous behaviour. TC Kirrily saw greater diversity in content, emphasising education and preparation. The findings suggest the need for an integrated approach, leveraging traditional media and platforms like TikTok to deliver clear, accessible, and engaging communication during emergencies.

The Natural Hazards Research Forum returns to Adelaide on 18-20 June 2025, showcasing the latest natural hazards research, expert keynote speakers and knowledge collaboration.

The LGAQ’s biennial Queensland Disaster Management Conference will take place in the first half of the year, with the program and link to register soon to be released. Delivered in partnership with Queensland Police Service, Queensland Fire Department, Queensland Reconstruction Authority and Office of the Inspector-General Emergency Management, the conference will run from 27–29 May 2025 at the Brisbane Convention & Exhibition Centre.

This event presents a valuable opportunity to explore how ideas, case studies, and research can be practically applied to enhance disaster management strategies. Attendees will gain insights into innovative approaches, lessons learned, and emerging best practices, strengthening resilience across Queensland communities. Click here to view events details. 

The 2025 Lessons Management Forum will be a hybrid event held at Wharewaka Function Centre in Wellington, New Zealand and online from 20-22 May 2025.

The aim of the forum is to provide professional development and networking collaboration opportunities and knowledge sharing for lessons practitioners, to support and grow the practice of lessons management and promote a learning culture. 

With the extent, severity and frequency of bushfires increasing due to a range of factors including climate change, what is the potential impact of bushfires on people, the environment and energy networks? 
Find out how Powerlink Queensland (Powerlink) and researchers used the Project IGNIS model to identify higher-risk locations across their transmission network, as well as inform internal decision-making processes about bushfire risk mitigation strategies, policies and operational imperatives.

A fascinating look at global post-disaster resilience housing programs and what they mean for Australia. Register now.